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Executive Summary 
 
This paper explores the role of digital and traditional media in shaping 
IRUPDO DQG LQIRUPDO OHDGHUV¶ LQWHUDFWLRQV ZLWK WKHLU RZQ FRQVWLWXHQFLHV DQG D
broader audience, by both advancing their messages and narratives and 
manoeuvring to steer a specific political agenda. It specifically considers the role of 
power, leadership and strategic communications in both exacerbating and 
mitigating violent conflict in emerging democracies. By weaving together strands of 
the political science scholarship on political communication and political settlement, 
while engaging with concepts of hybrid governance and leadership, we attempt to 
knit a framework that challenges normative assumptions on institutional 
communicative practices.  By bringing together these disparate strands of 
scholarship that are rarely in dialogue, we question a characterisation that often 
contrasts vertical mainstream media with more horizontal and inclusive social 
media, arguing that a more nuanced view of the political significance of both 
spaces of communication is required, and one that highlights their interplay and 
blurs the boundaries between online and offline, and in doing so refocuses on the 
notion of power, placing it at the centre of analysis, to examine how entrenched 
relations of patronage can be let unscathed, transformed or even reinforced by 
networked forms of communication.  
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Introduction 
While governance, political communication and conflict have attracted a great deal of 
attention in academia, the relationship among these concepts has seldom been explored. In 
this paper, we seek to fill this gap by looking at the ongoing debate on governance in 
conflict/post-FRQIOLFW VLWXDWLRQV IRFXVLQJRQGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQFRQIOLFWVGHILQHGDV ³FRQIOLFWV
that are triggered by, or accompany democratic change (or demands for democratic 
FKDQJH´ (Voltmer and Kraetzschmar, 2015 p.2). To do so, we engage with the literature 
that examines how traditional and new media shape the interactions between leaders and 
the public. In particular, we look at how both formal and informal authorities get their 
messages and narratives across, steer the political agenda and contribute to either mitigate 
or exacerbate social and political tensions. The decision to consider, on the one hand, 
leaders both de jure and de facto, on the other, old and new media, is a defining element of 
the approach of this paper, which challenges on the convergence of governance and 
democracy and on the democratising role of media, both old and new in young 
democracies. We therefore address concepts of hybrid governance, leadership, democratic 
transition and networks to question a widespread view that opposes vertical, asymmetric 
mainstream media to horizontal, symmetric social media.  
We draw on examples from (but not exclusively) the countries at the centre of the 
MeCoDEM project ± Serbia, Kenya, Egypt, South Africa ± to explore the critical role of 
media and ICTs in transforming the relationship between leaders and audience and, as a 
result, the dynamics among political authorities engaged in negotiation in the political arena.  
It is necessary to ask not only how leaders communicate with their constituents, but also 
how leaders communicate with each other, and how media are used to by elites as they 
negotiate power. Moving beyond views of the media either as a mouthpiece of the powerful 
or as a watchdog of power, we adopt a more nuanced approach that both highlights their 
interplay and blurs the boundaries between online and offline while bringing back to the 
centre the notion of power by examining how entrenched relations of patronage can be let 
unscathed, transformed or even reinforced by networked forms of communication.         
This paper opens by examining the notion of democratic leadership and the modes of 
communication through which it is expressed. The second part introduces the literature that 
discusses the interplay of political and media systems, moving beyond normative 
approaches based on the role ascribed to the media in representative and liberal 
democracies. The third part tackles the concepts of informal authorities, patronage and 
neopatrimonialism, and the way they provide a lens to examine the functioning of 
institutions and at spaces of interaction in emerging democracies. This is central for our 
analysis because in many of the states we are considering in MeCo'(0 µWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶
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has limited authority in certain communities, or territories.  On this basis, we then flesh out 
the notions of hybrid governance and political settlement in order to explain how leaders 
communicate with each other, negotiate and vie for leverage in the political arena, but at the 
fringe of democratic institutions. Next, it shifts the attention to the literature on the impact of 
ICTs, and social media in particular, on forms of mobilisation from below. Finally, the paper 
concludes by discussing how ICTs are changing the interplay of top-down and bottom-up 
communication practices, enabling the interweaving and mutual strengthening of patronage 
and technological networks, and what insights can be drawn for further research.     
 
Leadership and Communication  
While the role of leadership has often commanded significant attention from political 
scientists in the study of democratic governance, it has often been overlooked in the 
literature focusing on media and conflict. The contemporary debate on the concept of 
leadership, and charismaWLF OHDGHUVKLS LQSDUWLFXODU LVRIWHQJURXQGHG LQ:HEHU¶V WKHRU\RI
FKDULVPD$FFRUGLQJWR:HEHU¶VKLJKO\ LQIOXHQWLDOGHILQLWLRQFKDULVPDLV :  
a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is 
considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These 
are such as not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of 
divine origin or as exemplary and on the basis of them the individual 
concerned is treated as a leader. . . . What alone is important is how the 
individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority by 
his followers or disciples. (Weber 1947, pp.358±359) 
 
,Q:HEHU¶VYLHZFKDULVPDWLF OHDGHUVKLS LVRQHDPRQJ WKUHH IRUPVRIDXWKRULW\DORQJVLGH
legal and traditional leadership. In general, all three forms of authority share common 
features: they enable domination in unusual circumstances; they underpin a 
disruptive/revolutionary message; they are unstable and can fade away as historical 
circumstances change. However, the notion of charismatic leader, anointed by a 
transcendent authority and mostly modelled by Weber on the figure of the Biblical prophets 
(Taylor, 2012; Adair-Toteff, 2014), has continued to dominate studies on religious 
movements (Hackett, 1998).   
The concept has had significant currency in studies of the symbolic of power (Geertz, 
1977), particularly in post-colonial societies, where it has been applied within a functional 
framework, and historicisHG³WRH[SODLQWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURPFRORQLDO-ruled traditional society to 
politically independenW PRGHUQ VRFLHW\´ 7XFNHU  S (ODERUDWLQJ RQ :HEHU¶V
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DSSURDFK WR FKDULVPDWLF OHDGHUVKLS 7XFNHU SRLQWV RXW WKDW ³WKH FKDULVPDWLF OHDGHU LV QRW
simply any leader who is idolized and freely followed for his extraordinary leadership 
qualities, but one who demonstrates such qualities in the process of summoning people to 
join in a movement for change and in leDGLQJ VXFK D PRYHPHQW´ LELG S737). This 
suggests that the perception of the charisma of the leader should be constantly reproduced 
through communicative practices aimed at the mobilisation of the following.  
The conditions in which this mobilisation occurs are well summarised by Klaus 
DVKHSRLQWVWKDWWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIFKDULVPDLVEDVHGRQWKHFRQYHUJHQFHRI³a need, 
aVSLUDWLRQRUJRDODPRQJIROORZHUVWKDWUHPDLQHGXQIXOILOOHGE\DQH[LVWLQJVRFLDORUGHU´DQG
³D OHDGHU WRZKRP IROORZHUVZRXOGVXEPLWEDVHGRQ WKHLUEHOLHI LQKLVRUKHUSRVVHVVLRQRI
charisma²qualities that fulfilled their expectations. Simply stated, charisma emerges most 
YLYLGO\ ZKHQ SHRSOH LQ FULVLVZDQW D OHDGHU´ 7KHUH is, therefore, D GLUHFW OLQN LQ :HEHU¶V
perspective, between leadership and critical, and potentially conflictive, situations, as 
charismatic figures rise above the masses as they fulfill a need created by a volatile and 
unpredictable context.  
*LYHQ VSHFLILF µZLQGRZV RI RSSRUWXQLW\¶ RSHQHG XS E\ FRQWLQJHQW VRFLR-economic 
conditions, leaders would emerge, and underpin their influence over the masses, thanks to 
their mastery of what Bayart often in reference to African cases, (2005 [1996], p.110) defines 
µGLVFXUVLYHJHQUHV¶ LQWHQGHGDV UHSHUWRLUHVRIERWKGLVFRXUVHVDQGSRSXODUFRPPXQLFDWLYH
forms that include music and outfits, consolidated through previous interactions. The capacity  
of the leaders to successfully resort to these repertoires to build consent depends on the 
communicative strategies that convey their charismatic appeal to their followers. Charisma 
emanates from the personal attributes of the leader, and thus its appeal derives from its 
countering the process of routinisation elicited by the increased bureaucratisation of society, 
with its supposed equalising effect on the relations among citizens (Klaus, 2006).  In some 
respects, this form of charismatic leadership can aOVREHVHHQDV µQHR-SRSXOLVP¶:KHUHDV
the form of populism that proliferated across Latin America in the post war period 
incorporated trade unions into party organisations and the state, the form of populism we are 
increasingly seeing in parts of Africa is focused on portraying the leader as an outsider, an 
anti-institutionalism and as one that appeals to the masses for legitimacy (Carbone, 2005).    
7KHFKDULVPDWLFOHDGHUVKLSLQ:HEHU¶VYLHZGLVSHOVWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV
are equal before the law, an assumption on which representative democracies rest. 
Interestingly, Bernhard (1999) upends the conclusions of Weber as he discusses the 
relationship of charismatic leadership and democratisation in relation to democratic 
transitions in Eastern Europe. He argues indeed that charismatic leaders are not 
LQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKGHPRFUDWLFLQVWLWXWLRQVZKHUHE\FKDULVPDWLFDXWKRULW\LVµURXWLQL]HG¶ZLWKLQD  
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legal framework. Democratic legitimacy can be achieved as charismatic organisations go 
WKURXJK ³SURJUHVVLYH UDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ´ 7KH FKDULVPDWLF SRZHU LV ILUVW ³VXEMHFWHG WR UDWLRQDO-
OHJDOFRQVWUDLQWV´DQGWKHQWKHERQGVRIWKHFKDULVPDWLFFRPPXQLW\DUH³WUDnsformed into the 
reflective consent WKDWXQGHUSLQVGHPRFUDF\´LELG, p.14). According to this view, therefore, 
democracy has the potential to reshape the relationship between charismatic leaders and 
their followers and, when succeeding in avoiding drifts towards authoritarianism, may 
contribute to WKHHPHUJHQFHRIZKDW+LUVFKPDQGHILQHVD³UHVSRQVLEOHOHDGHUVKLS´3ULFHDQG
Stremlau, 2014).  
Responsible leaders are able to listen to the grievances of their following and manage 
expectations, thus contributing to defuse escalating conflicts. As Price and Stremlau point 
RXW ³UHVSRQVLEOH OHDGHUVKLS DOVR WROHUDWHV DQG HQFRXUDJHV ³YRLFH´ DV DQRWKHU PHDQV RI
EHLQJLQIRUPHGRISRWHQWLDOFULVHV³9RLFH´LVDYDOXDEOHUHVHUYRLURI LQWHOOLJHQFHDERXWGHHS-
seated strHVV RU UHVHUYRLUV IRU VXVWDLQHG FULWLFLVP´ LELG p.206). Drawing from their pre-
existing social capital and relying on different modes of interaction, leaders are thus able to 
capture and bring to the fore these voices. Understanding how ongoing transformations in 
the media have implications for these modes of interaction is, therefore, a key issue to tease 
out the changing role of charismatic leaders in governance and conflict resolution. In post-
Independence Africa, for instance, the notion of µFKDULVPDWLFDXWKRULW\¶KDVSURYLGHGDOHQVWR
examine the rise to power of nationalist leaders and parties (Apter, 1955; Ake, 1966, pp.6±
13; Zolberg, 1966). However, the case of post-colonial young democracies shows indeed 
that the encounter of charismatic leadership and democratic institutions does not necessarily 
entail the subordination of the former to the latter. Instead, rather than being reined in and 
domesticated by a democratic framework, charismatic figures may be able to seize the party 
or state machinery for personal aggrandisement and enrichment and, simultaneously, 
preserve a democratic veneer that commands legitimacy vis-a-vis external actors, such as 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO SDUWQHUV DQG GRQRUV 6RXWK $IULFD¶V SUHVLGHQW -DFRE =XPD DQG (J\SWLDQ
president, General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, are two cases in point, the former by recasting 
himself as a champion of social justice against growing socio-economic inequalities (Bond, 
2011), the latter as a saviour of the state against the looming threat of terrorism (Van de Bilt, 
2015). In their rise to power, both Zuma and al-Sisi have proven to be effective 
communicators, using the media to craft the narratives underpinning their power and, at the 
same time, preventing others from advancing messages that might threaten their role. In 
general, there is an ambivalent relationship between democratic government and the media 
which should be examined against the broader discussion on the nexus of politics and 
media.    
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The Politics and Media Nexus  
Despite fundamental theoretical divergences, different research approaches to media agree 
on the view that media systems not only reflect local norms and values, but also interact with 
politics and culture (de Smaele, 2015). In particular, the relationship of politics and media is 
informed by local ideas and structures of power that define the degree of independence of 
the latter from the former and, more broadly, the way they influence one another. Political 
actors use media to disseminate information, build consent, craft narratives and attack 
SROLWLFDORSSRQHQWV¶DJHQGDVDQGYLHZV7KH\FDQDOVRUHVWULFWPHGLDDXWRQRP\WKURXJKODZV
RUE\XVLQJVXEWOHUIRUPVRIGLVVXDVLRQIURPµFURVVLQJUHGOLQHV¶$WWKHVDPHWLPHPHGLDFDQ
play a key role in setting the political agenda by informing the public debate, therefore 
contributing to bringing about political and social change. However, the modes of interaction 
of media and political authority are highly contextual and cannot be reduced to a simple 
dichotomy as to whether the media are subordinated to the power, thus acting as an 
instruments of propaganda, or are instead in a position to hold it accountable and play a 
public service role. The literature on processes of democratisation focuses on both the role of 
the media in democratic transition and democratisation of the media itself (Hackett and Zhao, 
2005; see also Salgado, 2009) but, in so doing, mostly reproduces normative views of the 
PHGLD DV ³ D IRUXP HQFRXUDJLQJ SOXUDOLVWLF GHEDWH DERXW SXEOLF DIIDLUV  D JXDUGLDQ
against the abuse of power, and (3) a mobilising agent encouraging public learning and 
participation in the political SURFHVV´ -HEULOHWDOS6; see also Norris, 2000). Media 
freedom is thus largely perceived as both a benchmark of democratic reforms (see 
McConnell and Becker, 2002) and as a precondition for the proper working of democratic 
institutions (Berman and Witzner, 1997). By universalising functions ascribed to the media in 
Western democracies, this approach fails to capture the political economy of media 
organisations in political settings which, instead, should be understood in their own terms 
and according to their own logics. The way the media negotiate their relationship with the 
power is indeed depending on multiple aspects, spanning from the characteristics of the local 
media economy, which can create a market in which media attention and favours are 
purchased by political actors, to forms of path dependence in which loyalties or subordination 
to political authorities, whether informal leaders or apparatchiks from the previous regimes, 
persists despite formally embracing a democratic framework.  
These two aspects are often entangled. For instance, when discussing the political 
economy of media in Somalia, Stremlau et al. (2015) examine the phenomenon of the paid 
news, political advertisement and so-FDOOHGVKXUXURUµWRNHQVRIJUDWLWXGH¶SDLGE\RIILFHUVWR
reporters to cover political events, against a background in which the widespread lack of 
economic resources and high insecurity makes the reliance on political protection the only 
way to stay in business (and, often, to stay alive). In post-conflict situations, where the state 
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is weak or has limited reach, a media system should be understood according to its own 
logic, rather than the extent to which it compares to normative assumptions about media 
performance, otherwise important aspects will be overlooked.  At the same time, as the 
example of post-Socialist countries well illustrate, organisational logics of media and 
MRXUQDOLVWV¶ YDOXHVDQG SUDFtices derived from can be so ingrained in the social milieu and 
institutional culture to survive the demise of the previous regime (Voltmer and Rownsley, 
2009; Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013; Hallin and Mancini, 2013), although the extent to which 
this affects the trajectories of Eastern European democracies is currently not fully 
understood. In the case of the Egyptian transition from a regime to another, and through a 
short-lived democratic lull, El-Issawy (2014) observes that: 
Self-censorship habits are entrenched in the practices of Egyptian journalists, 
who largely perceive their role as servants of political masters. Even though 
the debate on reforming media was high on the agenda during the time of the 
revolution, this subservient perception did not change. Journalists were still 
struggling to cope with a new environment where they could operate without 
instructions (p.9)  
It is worth noting that the self-censorship of journalists, in Egypt as in other contexts 
experiencing political instability, not always stems from the fear of political retaliations, but is 
DOVR³DVDQH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHLUOHDQLQJZLWKWKH³VWDWH´DJDLQVWWKH³WHUURULVWV¶´LELG p.74). In 
addition to this, despite freedom of expression being enshrined in the Egyptian constitution, 
³approximately 35 articles in various laws prescribe penalties for the media, ranging from 
ILQHV WR SULVRQVHQWHQFHV´ LELG, p.21). Moreover, the independence of the press can be 
FXUWDLOHG³LQZDUWLPHDQGJHQHUDOPRELOLVDWLRQ´LELG, p.27), so that the declaration of a state 
RIµH[FHSWLRQDOLW\¶WRIDFHDOOHJHGWKUHDWVWRWKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\FDQSURYLGHWKHMXULGLFDODQG
moral ground for suspending a number of civil liberties, including free expression. Besides 
explicit forms of censorship, which is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes, it is therefore 
necessary to take into account how also the interaction of economic and socio-cultural 
factors risk derailing democratic transition, particularly when the transformation of the media 
landscape is only seen in terms of liberalisation of the media market. In this case, the 
concentration of media ownership might converge, and buttress, what Mungiu-Pippidi (2008, 
p.FDOOVWKHµROLJDUFKL]DWLRQ¶RISROLWLFVWKXVDFWLYHO\FRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHHOLWHFDSWXUHRIWKe 
state. Considering the outcomes of the restructuring of the Russian media system following 
9ODGLPLU 3XWLQ¶V ULVH WR SRZHU LQ  'XQQ  REVHUYHV WKDW DQ RVWHQVLEO\ GLIIXVH
structure of ownership is not at all in contradiction with a centralised scrutiny but, instead, it 
DOORZVIRUDWLJKWFRQWUROGLVJXLVHGDVDµWZRWLHUPHGLDV\VWHP¶LQZKLFKRXWOHWVVXERUGLQDWHG
to the Kremlin coexist with others enjoying a certain degree of autonomy. This system was 
akin to the Italian lottizzazione, an informal arrangement devised in the 1970s to allow the 
then major political parties, the Christian Democracy (DC), the Socialist Party (PSI) and the 
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Communist Party (PCI), to share control of the three TV channels of the state broadcaster 
RAI (DC secured control of RAI 1, PSI of RAI 2 and PCI of RAI 3) by supporting journalists 
DOLJQHGZLWK HDFKSDUW\¶V OLQHDW WKHKHDG RIHDFKFKDQQHOVDQGDEOH WRJLYH WR WKHPHGLD
agenda a well recognisable political direction (Gomez and Travaglio, 2004). This form of 
shared control remained in place as commercial TVs (and the ambitious media tycoon and 
subsequent Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi) made their foray in the Italian media system 
during the 1980s, and continued to project a veneer of pluralism and checks and balance. 
The ultimate goal of the control of the state over the media is the monopoly of narratives 
upon which the leadership grounds its political and moral claims to rule. Again, this was 
SDUWLFXODUO\ HYLGHQW LQ WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ ZKLFK ³SUHVHQWHG D FOHDU FRKHUHnt, and distinct 
PHGLDPRGHOLQOLQHZLWK LWVJHQHUDOSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFDQGLGHRORJLFDOPRGHO´GH6PDHOH
2010).   
The Role of Political Ideology 
Central to understanding leadership, and the relationship between leadership 
(whether populist or charismatic) and government communications, is the role of ideology 
and how it shapes the actions, goals and motivations of leaders. Political ideologies also 
suggest the boundaries of possible action and reforms. They are symbolic-cognitive frames 
that, intertwined with the symbols, language and discourse, give form to power relations and 
politics (Panizza, 2004).  In a way, they become laws and policies  providing the scope and 
priorities of what must be done in conflict-affected situations.  And communications laws and 
policies are also created in such a way to reinforce certain ideas- to elevate some and 
marginalise others.  
Understanding ideas, particularly the political ideas that have shaped the thinking of the 
governments, political parties and leaders we focus on, primarily comes through analysing 
texts such as political speeches, the publications of academics and politicians, party media, 
laws, curriculum and educational materials, and discourses embedded within them, sometimes 
subtly while other times more overt. In a way, this is also an exercise in archaeology, to 
understand the present approach to political communications one must also look back to the 
literature, experiences, and individuals that shaped the political ideologies of those in power. 
There is often an incorrect assumption, that because it is difficult to access conflict 
parties it is difficult to study them and understand their calculations. Media is one important 
inroad to accessing such views. Across our case studies conflict parties, government actors, or 
opposition political parties with armed wings, often had sophisticated media and propaganda 
strategies that were refined over decades. This can be seen as an important precursor to 
contemporary government communications. Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the 
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African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa ran Radio Freedom from the 1970s to the 
1990s, which is credited as being the oldest nationalist radio.  Broadcasting from neighbouring 
countries, Radio Freedom was instrumental in rallying South Africans and informing them of 
the struggle. Across Southern Africa, liberation groups protesting white rule had similar 
stations ± WKH6RXWK:HVW$IULFD3HRSOH¶V2UJDQL]DWLRQVRI 1DPLELD 6:$32EURDGFDVWHG
Voice of Namibia, the ZLPEDEZH $IULFDQ 3HRSOH¶V 8QLRQ =$38 ODXQFKHG 9RLFH RI WKH
Revolution and other guerrilla groups across Southern Africa including in Angola and 
Mozambique all had similar stations. Radio stations were also complemented with newsletters, 
newspapers and other communications initiatives, such as mobile theatre groups, to convince 
war weary populations to join a struggle. What these different actors have in common was the 
capacity to use the media to craft and communicate strategic narratives with the goal of 
mobilising support. Miskimmon et al. (2014) define strategic narratives as: 
representations of a sequence of events and identities, a communicative tool 
through which political actors ± usually elites ± attempt to give determined 
meaning to past, present and future in order to achieve political objectives. 
Critically, strategic narratives integrate interests and goals ± they articulate 
end states and suggest how to get there. (p.5) 
As Frederiksson and Pallas (2016) point out, strategic narratives are strongly contextual, 
LQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\DUH³UHGHILQHGDQGUHIRUPXODWHG±more or less deliberately²in relation 
WRUXOHVQRUPVDQGLGHDVSHUPHDWLQJGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WV´p.153). 
These radio stations often transitioned directly into the state broadcaster or the leaders 
of these armed struggles often had prominent roles in the liberation governments, running 
government communications. In South Africa, Zwelakhe Sisulu, son of the well-known 
liberation leader Walter Sisulu, and a leading journalist for ANC publications during the 
VWUXJJOHDQG5DGLR)UHHGRPWKH$1&¶VVWDWLRQWKDWEURDGFDVWHGIURPQHLJKERULQJFRXQWULHV
was appointed as the first head of the South African Broadcast Corporation (SABC) after 
apartheid. Further north in Ethiopia, Amare Aregawi, the head of the TPLF clandestine radio, 
shaped the Ethiopian Television and later the Ethiopian News Agency during the transition in 
1991, before leaving to launch one of the first private papers, The Reporter.  
In the case of Somaliland, the insurgency radio, Radio Halgan, almost directly 
transitioned to be the new government broadcaster, Radio Hargeisa, with the head of Radio 
Halgan as the first director. Similar appointments to leading media positions were made 
across the continent as part of post-war, or post-insurgency, transitions, from Namibia and 
Zimbabwe to Rwanda and Uganda (Stremlau and Gagliardone, 2014). 
The past experiences, and the philosophical inspirations some of these groups have 
GUDZQ RQ IURP 0DR¶V WKHRU\ RI OLEHUDWLRQ VWUXJJOH DQG JXHUULOOD Zar to Marxist-Leninism, 
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inevitably continue to shape and influence contemporary world-views and to some extent, 
provide inspiration and guidance, even if the political ideas have seemingly fallen out of 
fashion. Understanding the ideological roots of contemporary conflicts, how these ideas 
manifested themselves, is central to diagnosing how their legacy has continued to influence 
current political thinking, policies and institutional development.  The current conflicts are, after 
all, often rooted in these larger more historical conflicts. 
Patronage, Neopatrimonialism and Communication  
The use of democracy to reproduce, and reinforce, pre-existing relations of domination 
is at the centre of the discussion on the concepts of patronage and neo-patrimonialism. Here 
the emphasis on the irrational nature of the charisma of the leader gives way to a more 
down-to-earth reflection on the way proof of leadership (and governing powers more broadly) 
is given by being able of forging alliances through the distribution of favours and the creation 
of personal obligations. This aspect highlights the importance of communicative practices 
and spaces and technologies of communication that enable both horizontal and vertical 
communication, and both to facilitate the coordination among members of the same network 
and for funnelling demands and grievances to political leaders. This entails a further 
question: Are political leaders able and keen to listen? And what happens when the channels 
of communication funnelling these voices are hijacked by the same actors that are supposed 
to be challenged?   
The work of Chabal and Daloz (1999) has mostly revolved around the idea of 
patronage to explain how African politics works. They use patron networks as a key to 
explain the hurdles to fully develop representative institutions in Africa. Their view, aligned 
with a broader criminalisation perspective on African politics (Bayart et al., 1999), is based on 
WKH REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW OHDGHUV¶ OHJLWLPDF\ GHULYHV QRW IURP WKHFDSDFLW\ WR FRQWULEXWH WR the 
public good in an impersonal manner, but rather from their personal connections. In such a 
FRQWH[W µYHUDQGDSROLWLFV¶ LVFHQWUDO$V(PPDQXHO7HUUD\KDVDUJXHGDQGKDV ODWHUEHHQ
picked up by Bruce Berman in reference to Kenya, there are informal spaces, e.g. the 
veranda, that are more central to politics and political decision making than the more formal 
places. Terray contrasted veranda politics with air-conditioning politics in reference to the 
more formal, bureaucratic spaces that are more visible to international actors and reflect the 
kinds of western Weberian institutions one might expect to see in a country on a assumed 
µGHPRFUDWLsDWLRQ SDWK¶ The veranda is where serious business occurs, decisions are 
communicated and trusted messages are spread (Berman & Lonsdale, 1992).  
Patronage relationships can lead to what Dupuy (2006), drawing from Weber, defines a 
µSUHEHQGDU\ VWDWH¶ LQ ZKLFK ³WKRVH ZKR KROG VWDWH SRZHU OLYH RII SROLWLFV´ p.28) directly 
through bribes or rent-seeking. However, they can also be embedded within a democratic 
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framework, thus turning into a neopatrimonial system. Bratton and van de Walle (1994) point 
out that: 
As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather 
than to an office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty 
and dependency pervade a formal political and administrative system and 
leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to 
acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public 
interests is purposely blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award 
by public officials of personal favours, both within the state . . . and in society . . 
. (p.458) 
 
In order to remark the difference with patronage, Bach (2011) clarifies that: 
neopatrimonialism in Africa is still classically viewed as the outcome of a 
confusion between office and officeholder within a state endowed, at least 
formally, with modern institutions and bureaucratic procedures. The 
LQWURGXFWLRQ RI µQHR¶ DV D SUHIL[ DOVR PHDQV WKDW QHRSDWULPRQLDOLVP is freed 
from the historical configurations with which patrimonialism had been 
associated by Weber (p.277).  
 
([DPLQLQJWKHULVHRIµJDWHNHHSLQJSROLWLFV¶LQ6RXWK$IULFD%HUHVIRUGFULWLFLses 
WKH ³WHOHRORJLFDO IDWDOLVP´ GHULYHG IURP &KDEDO DQG 'DOR]¶V FULPLQDOLVDWLRQ SHUVSHFWLYH RI
African politics and, instead, observes that: 
most African countries today resemble a hybrid form of political system in 
ZKLFK µVLJQLILFDQWHOHPHQWV¶RISDWURQ±FOLHQWSROLWLFV µVXUYLYHDQG WKULYH today 
without decisively undermining democratic processes or development. (p.227) 
 
This is not to deny the importance of informal patron-client networks in Africa, but it is 
rather a call to enquire how, and under which circumstances, this way of doing politics may 
yield different results regarding the functioning of the state, the provision of services to the 
citizens and, more broadly, mechanisms that allow clients to hold their patrons accountable. 
although labels such as patrimonialism, prebendalism and neopatrimonialism have proven 
particularly popular in African studies, they have been applied also to the study of polities 
only recently embracing liberal democracy.  
'LVFXVVLQJWKHZDYHRISRSXODUSURWHVWVWKDWOHDGWRWKHGHPLVHRI0LORVHYLF¶VUHJLPH
in Serbia in Serbia, 9ODGLVDYOMHYLü  REVHUYHV WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI ³D  populist 
competitive authoritarian regime (...) into an exclusive personalist rulership with neo-
SDWULPRQLDO IHDWXUHV´  'UDZLQJ RQ /HYLWVN\ DQG :D\  he elaborates on the 
FRQFHSWRI ³FRPSHWLWLYHDXWKRULWDULDQLVP´DSROLWLFDO V\VWHP IHDWXULQJ ³DQ µLQKHUHQW WHQVLRQ¶
EHFDXVHWKHGHPRFUDWLFSURFHGXUHVLWLQYROYHVSURGXFHµDUHQDVRIFRQWHVWDWLRQ¶ZLWKLQZKLFK
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RSSRVLWLRQ DFWRUV PD\ OHJDOO\ FRQIURQW DXWKRULWDULDQ UXOHUV´ p.20). The literature suggests 
that competitive authoritarian systems are more volatile than democracies and are often 
followed by democracy (Brownlee, 2009: 516; Roessler and Howard, 2009, p.119±122). In 
the specific case of Serbia, the one-party system had increasingly morphed into a neo-
patrimonial system based on the charisma of the leader, employing cronyism to take 
personal control of the party and of the whole political apparatus. 
In her ethnography of Egyptian informal networks, for instance, Elyachar explores the 
PHDQLQJ RI ZKDW VKH FDOOV µSKDWLF ODERXU¶ DLPHG DW WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI FRmmunicative 
FKDQQHOV WKURXJK ZKLFK UHSXWDWLRQ LV EXLOW DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ IORZV WKXV FUHDWLQJ D ³VRFLDO
infrastructure on which other projects oriented around the pursuit of profit could be 
FRQVWUXFWHG´(O\DFKDUS453). Assessing microfinance initiatives for women in Cairo, 
she argues that the motives behind the cultivation of these channels go beyond the 
³HPSRZHUPHQW IUDPHZRUN´ UHJXODWLQJ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI WKH SURJUDPPHV DQG VKLIWHG
between a social and a monetary scale of value (ibid.). At the centre of this phatic labour, 
Elyachar recognises the critical role of the waasta, a broker of social relations that acts as a 
conduit to vertical networks, bridging deprived Egyptian women and political elite. The 
concept of waasta has been extensively investigated in informal economies, particularly in 
the Middle East. The term stands for both the person acting as intermediary and the 
connections to which she may grant access (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993). Although 
waasta is often conflated in Western scholarship with nepotism or corruption (Bellow, 2004), 
the concept refers to a principle that articulates loyalty and access to power (Mann, 2014). In 
her study of informal networks in Cairo, for instance, Singermann (1995) argues that, by 
increasing the coordination, these networks create a convergence of interests among 
members. Drawing from her work, Elyachar (2010) suggests that the waasta is central in 
performing the µSKDWLFODERU¶E\IDFLOLWDWLQJWKHRSHQLQJRI³FRPPXQLFDWLYHFKDQQHOV´WKDWFDQ
SRWHQWLDOO\WUDQVPLWQRWRQO\ODQJXDJHEXWDOONLQGVRIVHPLRWLFPHDQLQJDQGHFRQRPLFYDOXH´
(p.453).  
While media is often regarded as potentially disrupting or breaking patronage 
networks (e.g. much is often made about its potential impact to reduce corruption and hold 
governments to account) (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Coronel, 2010; Norris, 2004), and there is 
DULFKOLWHUDWXUHRQPHGLDDQGFRUUXSWLRQLQFOXGLQJWKHSROLWLFVRIµEURZQHQYHORSHV¶(Lodamo 
and Skjerdal, 2009; Nwabueze, 2010) where journalist ethics are challenged by payments 
and favours by those in power, there is far less research on how patronage networks shape 
the structure and dynamics of the media from within. This issue is becoming far more 
pressing as it is becoming inFUHDVLQJO\ DSSDUHQW WKDW WKH µKRUL]RQWDO¶ RU VXSSRVHGO\
democratisating and levelling effects of social media are just as malleable to power as 
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traditional media (Gagliardone, 2015).  Emerging research is demonstrating how public 
authorities, for example, are increasingly using radio call in shows to advance their interests 
by changing the overall structure of the programming, while attempting to maintain the 
apparent character of the media as open. This may be achieved through dedicated lines for 
particular political parties that are regularly given preference or through paid callers that are 
commissioned to skew the debate or conversation (Brisset-Foucault, 2016; Nunoo, 2016).  In 
some cases, patronage networks are so inbuilt into the system, it suggests the need for an 
entirely different way of conceptualising the media system that runs according to its own logic, 
rules and norms. Somalia is an example of such an environment where, almost completely 
devoid of central government, the media, and ICTs, have flourished and expanded 
developing unique roles and funding patterns (Stremlau et al., 2015; Stremlau et al., 2015 
(2)).  Patronage, and the many possible manifestations, must be taken seriously as a key 
aspect of government communications suggesting that the structure of the system, or what is 
sometimes below the formal state structures and may not always be spoken, is a crucial way 
of setting the boundaries of communication and privileging certain messages and speakers.  
Hybrid governance and political authorities 
Ahead of examining how media and ICTs shape the relationship between authorities 
and citizens, and the implications in terms of accountability and conflict resolution and 
transformation, it is necessary to tackle the debate on governance and leadership.  
:HIRFXVRQWKHWHUPµK\EULGJRYHUQDQFH¶EXWZHQRWHWKDWLWLVXVHGLQWZRGLIIHUHQW
ways. Both are relevant for MeCoDEM and for the study of government communications 
DOEHLW LQGLIIHUHQWZD\V7KHILUVWXVHRIµK\EULGJRYHUQDQFH¶ LVPRUHFRPPRQDQGIRFXVHV
on political transitions- typically from authoritarian or less democratic to more democratic, or 
µJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶ (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Rocha Menocal et al., 2008).  
The second use of the term is more common in African studies literature and refers to the 
blending of the state, the informal and the formal and the intersections between a variety of 
JRYHUQDQFHDFWRUVRUµSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV¶(Kelsall, 2008; Meagher et al., 2014).     
In the first context, the political science literature primarily focuses on the contribution 
of media to democratic institution building in countries emerging from authoritarian regimes 
and transitioning towards a more participatory model of governance. While democratisation 
UHIHUVWRµDFRPSOH[ORQJWHUPG\QDPLFDQGRSHQ-ended process; it consists of progress 
towards a more ruleǦbased, more consensual and more participatory typH RI SROLWLFV¶
(Whitehead, 2002, p.27), consolidating democracies involves the participation of different 
actors, including the media, to create checks and balances that make democracies secure 
(Schedler, 1998). Fukuyama points out that the link between democracy and governance is 
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not straightforward but it reflects one among other interpretations of the concept, and 
specifically the extent to which a government needs to be democratic or not, governance, 
DIWHUDOO LVSULPDULO\ IRFXVHGRQD JRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\ WRPDNHDQG HQIRUFH ODZVGHOLYHU
justice and security. To briefly return to the issue of patronage and neopatrimonialism 
mentioned above, Beekers and Van Gool (2012) observe that:     
the challenges to good governance reform around the developing world are 
related to longer histories of political practice, often characterized by the 
appropriation of power as a personal asset and by the clientelist 
redistribution of wealth and official positions. Interestingly, such political 
SUDFWLFHVH[SRVHWKHLURZQLQGLJHQRXVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIZKDWµJRYHUQLQJ
ZHOO¶HQWDLOV (p.4) 
This leads to consider governance as a patchwork, or the outcome of an ongoing 
negotiation among heterogeneous actors, engaged in communicating with each other and 
with their own constituencies ± or, in other words, a hybrid. Discussing hybrid political 
orders, Clements (2008) suggests that they are µFKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ D FRQWUDGLFWRU\ DQG
dialectic co-existence of forms of socio-political organization that have their roots in both 
non-VWDWHLQGLJHQRXVVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHVDQG LQWURGXFHGVWDWHDQGVRFLHWDOVWUXFWXUHV¶p.13). 
Hybrid forms of governance often characterise phases of democratic transition featuring 
both old and new regime institutions (Shin, 1994). 
7KH GLVFXVVLRQ RQ µJRRG JRYHUQDQFH¶ JDLQHG FHQWUH-stage in policy-making and 
development circles in the 1990s, as a response to the failure of aid policies inspired by the 
withdrawal of the state and the opening to the free market that had characterised the aid 
paradigm during the previous decade. It also reflected part of the broader democratisation 
paradigm of that period, setting in place the economic and political frameworks that would 
increasingly be part of western-driven norms. Good governance debates, and the role of 
media and government communication as part of these reforms, have certainly been central 
in the four emerging democracies at the core of MeCoDEM, but they have also developed in 
different ways.  For instance, in Serbia, the need to address the structural weakness of what 
3DYORYLü and $QWRQLü  ODEHOOHG DQ ³XQGHU-FRQVROLGDWHG GHPRFUDF\´ KDV GULYHQ D
discussion on how to secure a balanced relation among the branches of the state against a 
background in which the executive power exerts greater influence than the judiciary and the 
legislative power (Ejdus, 2010, p.7). In post-Apartheid South Africa, the inexorable 
withdrawal of the state has stirred a debate on the unequal speed of social and economic 
reforms, with the former lagging behind the latter (Bassett and Clarke, 2000), while in Egypt 
the reflection on governance has recently revolved around the subordination of the civil 
authority to the army (Bhuiyan, 2015; Mietzner, 2014). Eventually, in Kenya, the focus has 
mostly been on devolution and local governance (Cheeseman et al., 2016; Hope, 2014).   
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³%ULQJLQJWKHVWDWHEDFNLQ¶(YDQVet al., 1985) became the new dominant paradigm 
in international development and ³JRRGJRYHUQPHQWDQG ODWHUJRRGJRYHUQDQFHFDPHWR
EHVHHQDV WKHQHFHVVDU\SUHFRQGLWLRQV IRUVRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW´ (Beekers 
and Van Gool, 2012, p.2).  Such a perspective suggests the centrality of government 
communications including reform of state broadcasters or official communications channels. 
:KLOHPXFKRIWKHIRFXVKDVEHHQRQVXSSRUWLQJWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDµIUHHPHGLD¶WRKROG
government to account, or as part of broader civil society initiatives, there has been some 
pushback around state broadcasting reforms.  James Deane, for example, has recently 
argued for an urgent rethinking about the role of state broadcasters to encourage discussion 
and dialogue in conflict states. Moving away from the current focus on horizontal, digitally 
enabled networks which he sees as being over emphasised, Deane argues for a return to 
more vertical communications which can have a key role in nationbuilding (Deane, 2015). 
As state institutions were again invested of a central role in catering to the needs of their 
FLWL]HQV JRRG JRYHUQDQFH ³EHFDPH ERWK D conditionality for receiving bilateral and 
multilateral aid, as well as an objective of development assistance in itself (ibid.).  
Despite a widespread agreement on the importance of the concept, the meaning of 
good governance remains contested, due to its prescriptive approach. Widely used is the 
:RUOG %DQN¶V :% GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ µD ZHOO-functioning and 
DFFRXQWDEOHFRUHSXEOLFVHFWRU¶:RUOG%DQN, p.5) pursuing an economic growth and 
poverty-reduction agenda.  But it also has been seen as putting too much emphasis on 
formal state institutions.  Critics such as Weiss (2000, p.804), Santiso (2001) and Hyden et 
al. ( KDYH XQGHUOLQHG WKH WHFKQRFUDWLF QDWXUH RI WKH :%¶V GHILQLWLRQ DQG RWKHU
development bodies, such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have 
moved towards a view of governance that emphasises the significance of processes of 
participation in which those politically and economically marginalised have the opportunity to 
have their voices heard (UNDP 1997). This view of governance thus includes not only the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state and elected officials, but also private and civil society 
actors (Rosenau 1992, p.4, Bøås 1998, p.120) and more closely starts to resemble the 
FRQFHSWRIµK\EULGJRYHUQDQFH¶ZHZLOOGHVFULEHEHORZ+RZHYHULW LVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKLV
approach still tends to focus on the formal civil society groups or formal channels for citizens 
to express voice.  
This second approach to hybrid governance moves away from a normative definition 
of the concept towards actual practices and models of provision of services and 
management of conflicts that are rooted in specific settings and reflect different modes of 
engagement with the public. Moreover, the coexistence of multiple political orders, some of 
which are embedded in the socio-cultural fabric, is more likely to ensure a more efficient 
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delivery of services at a local level. Some of the most important work on this topic has been 
carried out by the Overseas Development Institutes (ODI) Africa Power and Politics (APP) 
programme.  In many respects, the research of APP has responded directly to the failures of 
the good governance programme and has sought to bring to the centre of analysis a more 
realistic understanding of power, accountability and social morality that have been important 
drivers of governance.  Central to this is understanding how political or development reforms 
LQFRQIOLFWVLWXDWLRQVFDQµZRUNZLWKWKHJUDLQ¶RUEXLOGXSRQWKHH[LVWLQJIUDPHZRUNVYLHZV
and practices of accountability and governance (Bagayoko et al., 2016; Kelsall, 2012).  
Taking into account this broader perspective of governance, and indeed, loci of power that 
provides services such as justice and security, encourages a broader approach to 
µJRYHUQPHQWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶$V UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH LQFUHDVLQJO\ LQFOXVLYHVFRSHRI:3ZH
KDYH XUJHG FRXQWU\ WHDPV WRFRQVLGHU µSXEOLF DXWKRULWLHV¶ UDWKHU WKDQ VLPSO\ PHPEHUV RI
government. We have also sought to stress the importance of multiple spaces of 
communication where governance and power might be exercised- from religious meetings 
to community gatherings.  
As Hoehne (2013) points out, in reference for the need for a more grounded 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIJRYHUQDQFH³PRUHLPSRUWDQFHVKRXOGEHDFFRUGHGWRFXV tomary/traditional 
DQGRWKHUQRWGHPRFUDWLFDOO\OHJLWLPDWHG LQVWLWXWLRQV´p.199), as these institutions can both 
enjoy greater legitimacy and have a more in-depth knowledge of local dynamics. This is not 
to say that understanding hybridity in political orders is simply to include the informal and 
IRUPDO +RHKQH ZDUQV DERXW WKH OLPLWV RI K\EULG SROLWLFDO RUGHUV VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW ³WKH
relationship between states and traditional/customary authorities is not necessarily 
harmonious (but) it can be characterized by substitution, complementarity and 
LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ ZLWK WKH ODWWHU OHDGLQJ WR FRQIOLFWV´ p.200). Therefore, of particular 
importance are the modes and the political spaces in which the symbolic and the material 
resources of the state at the centre of the political game, or, to use an expression by Alex 
De Waal (2015) that we will discuss later, of the political marketplace. Hagmann and 
3OHFODUGXVHWKHQRWLRQRI³QHJRWLDWLRQDUHQD´WRRYHUFRPHFRQYHQWLRQDOGLFKRWRPLHV
such as the one between state and society, or differentiate between the local±national±
international levels. Instead:  
Negotiation DUHQDVVWUXFWXUHVRFLDODFWRUV¶VFRSHE\FRQGLWLRQLQJ²but not pre-
determining²their inclusion in or exclusion from negotiation processes. 
Negotiation arenas have spatial, social and temporal dimensions²where are 
they situated? Who has access? Over what time period do they occur? ² Which 
need to be traced empirically on a case by case basis. Within these arenas 
statehood is negotiated in more or less formalized and routinized ways. (p.550) 
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Hagmann and Plecard oppose the negotiation arena to the negotiation table, where 
statehood is discussed in formal terms and by actors recognised as legitimate according to 
principles of representative democracy. On the contrary, the negotiation arena is a broader 
space where a variety of actors weight in their pre-existing resources and prestige and vie for 
a greater share of power and influence within the state. De Waal (2015) recognises in this 
arena the features of a marketplace in which elected and unelected authorities can display 
their adroitness at buying loyalties, not last by using the threat of violence as leverage, and at 
extracting economic resources from foreign donors. In the political marketplace, leaders 
weight in their influence over their own following and invest their patronage networks in the 
construction of new linkages. The literature on political settlement takes stock of the 
competition of different powerful actors (at political, economic and security level) to shape 
formal institutions and, although its main focus is on aid policies, which is beyond the scope 
of this paper, it, however, provides a useful framework to make sense of informal and 
heterogeneous power arrangements (North et al., 2009; Bell, 2015). This approach 
addresses mostly the interaction among elites, and the way they negotiate power. This 
negotiation often occurs behind closed door, but ICTs have increasingly reshaped the 
boundaries of the arena, allowing the leader to constantly keep his base updated on the 
ongoing process but, at the same time, exposing him to greater scrutiny from his 
constituency. Although the focus of the political settlement is on communication among 
leaders, for the purpose of WP6 we also need to ask how the negotiation spills over and 
becomes object of discussion between the leaders and his followers. The media have thus a 
central role, as they allow to build pressure on authorities, for instance through campaigns 
(Rao, 2013), or how media are controlled by powerful political actors to increase their 
leverage during the negotiations. This is not unproblematic. How Deane (2015) points out:    
Any debate about the role of media in governance is likely to be contested and 
divided into arguments around effectiveness (does supporting the media lead 
to improved governance outcomes?) and values (is supporting the media 
LQKHUHQWO\ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK D QRUPDWLYH GHPRFUDWLF ³:HVWHUQ´ IUDPHZRUN"
This contestation makes it especially difficult for media issues to be properly 
integrated into governance strategies. (p.265) 
$QH[DPSOHLVRIIHUHGE\6RXWK$IULFD¶VWUDQVLWLRQIURPDSDUWKHLGWRGHPRFUDF\GXULQJ
ZKLFKWKHFRXQWU\¶VUXOLQJHOLWHFRDOHVFHG³DURXQGDSROLWLFDOD[LVFDSDEOHRIFRQVWUucting and 
managing a new nat LRQDO FRQVHQVXV´ 0DUDLV  S85; see also Berger, 2002)). The 
outcome of this reconfiguration, however, was a black economic empowerment that benefited 
only a small black elite (Marais, 2001). In considering how the political settlement that 
followed the end of white minority rule took shape during the 1990s, it is necessary to take 
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into account the changing media landscape. During that decade, an emerging middle class 
increased its control over media previously owned by large corporations as an economic 
investment but also to buttress its still fledgling privileged position of privilege (Tomaselli, 
2004). As a result, the growing black ownership of South African media reproduced the pre-
existing class-based VRFLDOVWUXFWXUHZKLFKUHVWVDWWKHFRUHRIPDQ\RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VRQJRLQJ
conflicts, including the service delivery protests. This had a critical importance in shaping the 
transition phase as it influenced the way South Africans made sense of the changes their 
VRFLHW\ ZDV XQGHUJRLQJ 7KH PHGLD SOD\HG ERWK D µZLWQHVV¶ DQG D µUHLI\LQJ UROH¶
simultaneously bringing to the fore the transformations taking place in South Africa and 
producing a consistent narrative, made of images and information, of these changes (see 
also McConnell and Becker, 2002, p.9).  
New media and the re-making of government communication and publics 
The current transformation of the media landscape, particularly with the momentous 
diffusion of digital media, has reshaped the practices and the channels through which political 
leaders and publics engage with each other. ICTs innovations have further expanded the 
possibilities for citizens to access information, debate political issues and eventually mobilise 
(SIDA, 2009; Kreutz, 2010; Obadare; 2006; Naidoo, 2010) and for political authorities to get 
their messages and narratives across. However, most literature tends to draw a sharp line 
between communication from below and from above. The significance of communication for 
civil society organisations engaged in democratisation struggles has been thoroughly 
examined in WP5, while the specific role of new media in allowing greater coordination and 
scaling up mobilisations will be object of analysis in WP7.  However, as we tackle the specific 
issue of how governments, and governing bodies in a broader sense, use ICTs and social 
media to communicate in democratisation conflicts, two caveats are in order: 1) although the 
literature on popular protests and democratisation emphasises the importance of civil society 
organisations in coordinating protests, there is evidence of a critical role of traditional 
structures of power and leaders in acting as catalyst of collective action. It would be therefore 
useful to quickly dwell on cases of political mobilisation in which political and established 
authorities were able to occupy an intermediary position between protesters and 
governments in order to steer the protest and further their agenda; 2) digital media increase 
the possibility of interaction between political actors and citizens, and yet most scholarship on 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DQG PHGLD VHHPV FRQFHUQHGPDLQO\ ZLWK KRZ JRYHUQPHQWV
speak (Bickford, 1996) but not much with how government listen. This dimension deserves to 
be explored beyond the rigid formal/informal dichotomy, but considering instead the linkages 
between these domains and the variety of communicative and discursive practices that occur 
between publics and authorities.      
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Traditional leaders, new media, current protests 
As discussed in the WP5 literature review, the adoption of ICTs has had an impact on 
aadvocacy, awareness, research, mobilisation and protest, dramatically changing the 
strategies of civil society organisations and expanding their scope of action (see also 
Bagalawis, 2001; Kreutz, 2010). However, other studies have contextualised the impact of 
ICTs and social media in particular, looking at how they were embedded in pre-existing 
networks. Consider form instance People Power II, the series of demonstrations which took 
place in the Philippines in 2001 to oust then President Jose Estrada. The event has drawn 
ODUJH DWWHQWLRQ DPRQJ VFKRODUV KDLOHG LQ WKH ZRUGV RI &DVWHOOV HW DO  ³WKH ILUVW
occasion in human history when the mobile phone played an instrumental role in removing 
the head of the government of a nation-VWDWH´ p.266) (see also Bagalawis, 2001; Salterio, 
2001; Magapal and Nario-Galace, 2003; Liu and Gastardo-Conaco, 2011; Fukuoka, 2015). 
Significantly, while this event kindled the imagination of Western political scientists keen to 
see a potential for greater political participation, local analysts, such as Rafael (2003), 
remarked that the ousting of Estrada did not bring about a revolutionary change but, instead, 
paved the way to the rise of power to another member of the elite, the daughter of a former 
president, able to catalyse the Messianic expectations of the crowd. Moreover, these 
expectations did spread as text messages through mobile networks, and yet, they gain 
momentum only as they were amplified by channels of communication emanating from well-
established and powerful institutions, above all the radio of the highly influential Catholic 
Church (ibid., p.15). Despite the argument suggested by this evidence, most studies on new 
forms of political communication have continued to stress the disintermediating role of ICTs, 
often within a broader reflection on civil society and activism. The 2008 Iranian post-electoral 
unrests were framed as a powerful example of the capacity of the crowd to harness Twitter to 
get organised and bypass the restrictions imposed by an authoritarian regime. However, as 
Yahyanejad and Gheytanchi (2012) point out, also during the so-called Green Revolution the 
main opposition candidates, Hosein Musavi and Mehdi Karrubi, had an active role in creating 
and fostering, ahead of the elections, a pool of online activists who drove the street protests . 
'LVFXVVLQJ1RUWK$IULFD¶VXSULVLQJVZLWKDSDUWLFXODUIRFXVRQ(J\SW5HQQLFNIRU
example, challenges views that placed much emphasis on the role of ICTs in the protests that 
put an end to the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. She argues instead that: 
during the pre-mobilisation phase, social media allowed for the enlarging of the 
public sphere to new non-political actors, and permitted the sharing of 
grievances and the emergence of broad and resonant personal frames. During 
the collective action phase, mobilisation was able to occur thanks to frame 
alignment: a strategic process undertaken by activists to build collective 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHPRYHPHQW¶VVWUXJJOHWRFOHDUO\VSHOORXWLWVREMHFWLYHVDQG
to motivate people to action. In the case of the Egyptian revolution, this process 
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of frame alignment was based on the cultural norm of social justice. In addition, 
mobilisation was successful thanks to the emergence of hybrid organisational 
structures that relied on a cross between social media-based entrepreneurial 
networks and more traditional social movement organisations. (p.157). 
 
These examples brings to the fore the importance of hybrid institutional arrangements 
in shaping spaces of interaction and contestation and are consistent with the general 
argument on which the broader scholarship on popular protests and ICTs, and on the Arab 
Spring in particular, agrees: despite the critical role to coalesce opinions around political 
issues played by online media, such as blogs in Egypt (Lynch, 2007; Nawawi and Khamis, 
2014), there is not strong enough evidence to suggest that social media are a direct cause of 
revolutions (Anderson, 2011; Papic and Noonan, 2011; Aday et al., 2012; Dajani, 2012). 
Moreover, this literature sheds light on the relationship of ephemeral mobilisations and 
established organisations revolving around charismatic leaders. The adoption of a broad 
repertoire of media (word-to-mouth, internet, mobile phones, radios) to express grievances 
and call for social change enables the expansion of a space of debate and participation. As 
the Egyptian case mentioned above seems to suggest, this engagement does not emerge in 
a vacuum but, rather, it builds upon pre-existing structures of power.  
Participation: the making of publics and the politics of listening 
The rise of social media is ostensibly providing new opportunities and spaces for 
governments to listen to and engage their publics.  The communication literature offers some 
of the conceptual tools to examine how social media are inducing changes in the field of 
SROLWLFDOSXEOLFUHODWLRQVLQWHQGHGDV³WKHPDQDJHPHQWSURFHVVE\ZKLFKDQRUJDQL]DWLRQRU
individual actor for political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to 
influence and to establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with its 
NH\SXEOLFVWRKHOSVXSSRUWLWVPLVVLRQDQGDFKLHYHLWVJRDOV´6WUömbäck and Kiousis, 2011, 
p.8). Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2012) develop an analytical framework to examine the 
relationship between social media and political communication; Park et al. (2015), for 
instance, analyse the effect of Twitter, a micro-blogging platform, on public trust, while Chang 
and Kanan (2008) and Dorris (2008) examine the adoption of social media for reaching out to 
citizens, disseminating information to the public and sharing information across government 
agencies. Studies on crisis communication and disaster response pay a greater attention to 
the interactive character of social media, which enables rapid exchange of information among 
different actors (Schultz et al., 2011; Yates and Paquette, 2011). Other online spaces, such 
as blogs, havH EHHQ EUDQGHG DV ³VRSKLVWLFDWHG OLVWHQLQJ SRVW RI PRGHUQ GHPRFUDF\ ´
&ROHPDQDOWKRXJKWKHDUJXPHQWWKDW³EORJVORZHUWKHWKUHVKROGRIHQWU\WRWKHJOREDO
GHEDWHIRUWUDGLWLRQDOO\XQKHDUGRUPDUJLQDOLVHGYRLFHV´LVKLJKO\TXHVWLRQDEOH LELGp.277).  
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However, as mentioned above, the interactive potential of digital media strongly 
GHSHQGVRQWKHFRQWH[WRIHPEHGGHGQHVVDQGRQWKHOHDGHU¶VFDSDFLW\WRFUHDWHDQPDLQWDLQ
DYHQXHV RI SDUWLFLSDWLRQ RSHQ $ FDVH LQ SRLQW LV RIIHUHG E\ 2PDQJD¶V  VWXG\ on a 
Kenyan chief using twitter for community policing, thus expanding the deliberative structure of 
the baraza, a widespread Eastern African grassroots institution, into a digital, networked 
space of participation and dialogue between authorities and citizens. Social media are also 
hybridising more established loci of media interaction, such as radio programs, in which 
listeners are invited to call-in and express their opinion on a variety of current issues 
(Stremlau et al., 2015), However, despite the apparent openness of these spaces of 
discussion, the real extent and degree of participation remains problematic.  In his 
ethnography of two Kenyan radio stations, for instance, Gagliardone (2015) debunks 
assumptions of a linear relationship between participation and good governance and argues 
instead that the interplay of heterogeneous actors, networks and languages can reinforce 
some voices and silence others, thus entrenching pre-existing inequalities. Far from allowing 
symmetric relations, these spaces of interaction can turn into showcases of individual 
charisma.  
As ICTs have blurred the boundary between mass and interpersonal communication, 
the way information circulates and persuasion is exerted throughout social networks has 
substantially changed. The charisma-building function of mass media such as television and 
radio for political and religious leaders has been largely explored in different contexts. For 
instance, in Indonesia Hughes-Freeland (2007) examines the relationship of charisma and 
celebrity by focusing on the mediatisation of the repertoire of the symbols of power. 
'LVFXVVLQJµFKDULVPDWLF¶DXWKRULW\LQWKH*UHDW/DNHVUHJLRQRI(DVWHUQ-Central Africa, Vokes 
(2007) examines the usage of radio broadcast to both recruit proselytes and consolidate 
OHDGHUV¶LQIOXHQFHEXWDOVRWKHGLIIHUHQWIRUPVRIµFRQVXPSWLRQ¶RIUDGLRSURJUDPVLQ8JDQGD
and Rwanda. Particularly relevant is the work of Schultz on Muslim preachers and radio 
broadcast in West Africa (Schultz, 2013, 2014, 2015) and on the public presence of female 
radio preachers in Mali (2012). More recently, she has provided a detailed account of the 
construction of charismatic appeal among Muslim clerics in Mali, narrowing the focus on the 
role their responsible leadership played in easing social tensions in the aftermath of the 2012 
military coup (Schulz, 2015). Schulz (2012) also discusses the figure of as Ousmane Madani 
Haïdara, a Malian Muslim preacher and social media star who has cultivate her popularity as 
a charismatic leader on Facebook and Twitter.  Similarly, ICTs have also blurred the 
GLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQµDXGLHQFH¶DQGµSXEOLFV¶8QGHUVWDQGLQJXQGHUZKLFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQG
in which ways, an audience turns into a public entails a reflection on the notion of political 
participation, thus questioning what it means to participate in politics, and what it means for 
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OHDGHUV WR OLVWHQ WR WKHLU µSXEOLFV¶  0RVWO\ GLVFXVVHG LQ WKH PHGLD DQG FXOWXUDO VWXGLHV
literature, the concept of audience has proved increasingly significant to examine how the 
FKDQJLQJµPHGLDVFDSH¶$SSDGXUDLLVUHVKDSLQJVWDWH-citizens interactions, an issue at 
the core of the reflection on the procedures and the purposes of democracy. Livingstone 
(2005) focuses on the convergences and tensions between the notions of audience and 
SXEOLFGUDZLQJ IURP+DEHUPDV¶VWXG\RQ WKHHYROXWLRQRID ³SXEOLFVSKHUH´  LQZKLFK
citizens could rationally and critically debate issues of common interest. Historically cultivated 
in venues such as cafes and in the press, the public sphere was regarded as the locus in 
which the bourgeoisie could form and exchange opinions, a precondition for political action 
aimed at both mobilisation and institutional change. For this reason, the notion of public 
sphere features at the centre of a substantial literature on the transformations brought about 
by the mass media on the relationship between government institutions and citizens, and on 
how the boom of corporate media has impacted on this link (Garnham, 1992; Hallin, 1994).  
+DEHUPDV¶conceptualisation of the public sphere is aligned to the liberal-pluralist view 
of media as watchdog of the government, privately-owned so to stay independent from the 
SROLWLFDO SRZHU LQIRUPLQJ D ³PDUNHW-SODFH RI LGHDV´ UHVWLQJ RQ PDWHULDO LQIUDVWUXFWXUHV for 
spreading information and opinion. Kunreuther (2006), for instance, focuses on the role of 
Rumpum Connection, a radio program in which Nepalese in the homeland and abroad 
communicate with each other, shaping the very idea of Nepalese diaspora and forg ing a 
WUDQVQDWLRQDO SXEOLF VSKHUH DV ³1HSDOL VXEMHFWV LQ .DWKPDQGX UHDFKLQJ RXW WRZDUG WKH
GLDVSRUDDQGRVWHQVLEO\EULQJLQJ WKRVHYRLFHVRIGLDVSRULF1HSDOLVEDFN´ p.331). However, 
&XUUDQTXHVWLRQVWKHWUXO\µSXEOLF¶QDWXUHRIWKHSXEOLFVSKHUHDrguing instead that it 
referred to an elitist clique of privileged citizens able to reach consensus in order to affect 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQV7KLVDUJXPHQWFDQEHH[WHQGHGWRWKHUROHRISULYDWH-owned media 
in democratic transitions, opening questions on whether members of the elite controlling the 
media may hide vested interests behind the purported mission to enforce political 
accountability through watchdog journalism.  
,Q $IULFDQ VWXGLHV IRU LQVWDQFH WKH QRUPDWLYH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI +DEHUPDV¶ µSXEOLF
spKHUH¶ DUH YLHZHG VFHSWLFDOO\ WKURXJK D SRVW-colonial lens (Mamdani, 1996). For Ekeh 
(1975), the colonial experience has bequeathed African society two publics, a primordial and 
a civil public. While the latter emerges in the interaction with state institutions, the former is 
based on traditional, mainly ethnic, associations and occupies the political space by providing 
services and support to citizens left behind by the state. Other scholars have elaborated on 
WKHQRWLRQRISXEOLFLQ$IULFDEXLOGLQJRQ(NHK¶VUHIOHFWLRQDYRLGLQJ+DEHUPDV¶HOLWLVWYLHZRI
the public sphere by looking at the popular culture as the space in which publics (in the plural 
form) engage with politics (Barber, 1987; Ellis 1989; Spitulnick 2002; Willems, 2012). 
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/LYLQJVWRQHFKRLQJ'DKOJUHQ VXJJHVWV WR µVHH EH\RQG WKH IRUPDOSROLWLFDOV\VWHP¶
calling for investigating practices and institutions that do not fall squarely within conventional 
political categories. In general, the discussion on democratic engagement is often informed 
by normative assumptions on how and where political actors and citizens should 
communicate with each other. For instance, writing on the media-democracy relationship in 
Southern Africa, Berger (2002) reminds WKDW ³PDQ\ZULWHUV EXWQRWHQRXJKKDYHVRXQGHG
warnings about lifting concepts like media and democracy from western conditions and 
DSSO\LQJWKHPXQWKLQNLQJO\WR$IULFD´ (21). Moreover, by distinguishing democratic institutions 
and practices through which people participate in decision-making processes, he argues that 
performing democratic functions can blur the boundary between institutional political arenas 
and family and community spaces. This is a crucial question in the discussions on 
democratisation, and one that should be adapted to a changing technological ecosystem and 
different socio-cultural contexts.  
It is worth pointing out that a comparison has been drawn between the samizdat, 
independent Soviet-era dissident publications (see Pearce and Kendzior, 2012) and the 
internet, whose diffusion has presented authoritarian regimes with new challenges. Indeed, 
whether responding to dissent with crackdowns or allowing critical voices within certain limits 
was a dilemma that Shirky (2007) has explored with reference to East Germany in 1989, 
ZKHUH µµLI WKH VWDWH GLGQ¶W UHDFW WKH GRFXPHQWDWLRQ ZRXOG VHUYH DV HYLGHQFH WKDW WKH
protesting was safe. If the state did react, then the documentation of the crackdown could be 
used to spur an international outcry.¶¶p.164)  
&RQVHTXHQWO\ IRUPV RI ³QHWZRUNHG DXWKRULWDULDQLVP´ KDYH HPHUJHG LQ ZKLFK µµDQ
authoritarian regime embraces and adjusts to the inevitable changes brought by digital 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV¶¶0DF.LQQRQS([DPLQLQJRQOLQHGLVVHQWLQ$]HUEDijan, Pearce 
DQG .HQG]LRU  DUJXH WKDW ³QHWZRUNHG DXWKRULWDULDQLVP LVPDQLIHVW LQ SROLWLFDO WDFWLFV
that create selective social openings to create a semblance of transparency but in fact 
PRQLWRU DQG VWLIOH GLVVHQW´ p.287; see also Baogang and Warren, 2011). According to 
'HLEHUW DQG 5RKR]LQVNL  QHWZRUNHG DXWKRULWDULDQLVP SUDFWLFHG WKURXJK ³HIIHFWLYH
FRXQWHULQIRUPDWLRQFDPSDLJQVWKDWRYHUZKHOPGLVFUHGLWRUGHPRUDOL]HRSSRQHQWV¶¶p.27), is 
the newest form of political control of digital media, following direct censorship and filtering 
and the use of laws to regulate acceptable contents. Cases of networked authoritarianism 
should therefore be a caveat against assumptions on the linear correlation of online 
engagement and democratic participation. We need to ask instead whether ICTs, as they 
overlap, interweave or reshape networks through which leaders circulate information and 
mobilise their followers, reproduce or challenge pre-existing power relations.  
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<HW DV 'REVRQ  SRLQWV RXW µJRRG OLVWHQLQJ¶ FDQ KHOS DFKLHYH GHPRFUDWLF
REMHFWLYHV E\ ³HQKDQFLQJ OHJLWLPDF\ KHOSLQJ WR GHDO ZLWK GHHS GLVDJUHHPHQWV LPSURYLQJ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJDQG LQFUHDVLQJHPSRZHUPHQW´*HURGLPRV HPSKDVLses the impact of 
LQQRYDWLRQ RQ ³DFFHVV HQJDJHPHQW LQFRUSRUating education, motivation and trust), 
PHDQLQJIXOGHOLEHUDWLRQDQGDOLQNEHWZHHQFLYLFLQSXWDQGSXEOLFSROLF\RXWSXW´p.26). 
%HQKDELE  DUJXHV WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V OHJLWLPDF\ GHULYHV IURP WKH
preservation of this space of political participation in which the state can be held accountable. 
In African contexts, this function is often performed outside political spaces such as 
neighbourhood and religious gatherings, or in media that provide opportunities for interaction 
with leaders. This is the case, for instance, of radio call-in programmes, in which the 
audience can directly interact with political representatives (Thornborrow and Fitzgerald, 
2013). Although this mode of interaction is a far cry from being a tool of accountability and 
transparency according to normative ideas of these concepts, it has the potential to expand 
avenues of participation, allow members of the audience to exchange views and enable 
some limited form of control (Stremlau et al., 2015). ICTs have further reshaped the modes 
of interaction between leaders and their followers, as make possible to keep avenues of 
participation open by establishing a direct communication channel with political authorities. It 
is worth reminding here that we refer here to both formal and informal leaders and to the way 
they communicate with citizens, but also how they listen and are influenced in return.  
Conclusion: Between Digital and Neo-Patrimonial Networks  
When bringing together the different strands and arguments in this paper, a final 
aspect to consider relates to the transformations induced by the integration of ICTs in neo-
patrimonial networks. These transformations ought to be appraised against the background 
of the democratisation processes and the hybrid regimes mentioned above. Reflecting on the 
impact of ICTs on the political marketplace in the Horn of Africa, De Waal (2015) observes 
that: 
Better information and communication helps subordinate actors, but only 
in certain ways. Specifically, it helps them as individuals in the political 
marketplace Transactions are easier and cheaper. The deals they get 
are better. It follows that participation in the marketplace is more 
attractive. These technologies have not assisted the kind of detailed 
lengthy planning that undergirds sustained political struggles. Information 
technologies may democratize the political marketplace, but they will not 
transform it (p.208). 
Keeping communication channels open between the leader and his base makes 
possible to include other actors in the negotiation. At the same time, the coordination of 
collective actions from above via mobile phones and other ICTs and the possibility to stay in 
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touch with his clients provides the leader engaged in the negotiation arena with an 
opportunity to display his clout over their following and his capacity to resort to violence if 
necessary to increase his political leverage. The level of violence can thus be calibrated to fit 
a bargaining strategy. This approach offers a key to examine phenomena of political violence 
that would be otherwise labelled as expressions of tribalism. An example is the wave of 
unrests that swept Kenya in the aftermath of the December 2007 elections, when violence 
pitted the constituencies of the main candidates (Mueller, 2011; Sommerville, 2011; 
Markussen, 2011).   
Exploring the interaction of rumours and political agenda in the context of the 2008 
political violence in Kenya, Osborn (2008) points out that:  
it is the technologies of communication that have given rumour its particular 
potency in more recent years in Kenya. Where rumours were once local, taking 
time to percolate outwards and onwards to a broader, national audience, the use 
of high-tech communication, such as mobile phones, email, internet websites and 
weblogs, has transformed the pace and range of rumour (p.316). 
The ensuing investigation launched by the prosecutors of the International Criminal 
Court has argued that indeed the political violence that unfolded along ethnic lines was 
coordinated from above and indicted six high authorities, including current Kenyan 
President Uhuru Kenyatta (whose charges were subsequently dropped) and current vice 
president William Ruto (Lynch and Zgonec-5RåHM$FFRUGLQJ WR WKHSURVHFXWRUV LQ
that situation the suspected of crimes against humanity were responsible of having fuelled 
hatred and actively encouraged their supporters to commit acts of violence ± violence that 
resulted, according to conservative estimates, in the killing of 800 people and on the 
displacement of almost 180,000 (BBC, 2008). On the one hand, mobile communication was 
used to funnel the grievances of the constituencies to their political leaders through the 
intermediation of local authorities, the nodes of well-established neo-patrimonial networks; 
on the other, it was used to convey to drive disruptive actions that, in a very inflammatory 
context, were meant to raise the stakes and maximise the gain in the bargain, for the 
winning leader, with the promise of a trickle-down effect on its followers. The case of Kenya 
seems to suggest that ICTs may not only play a role in democratising the political arena, 
increasing the accountability of the leaders to his supporters, but also buttress neo-
patrimonial links, thus entrenching pre-existing power relations. Further research, however, 
is necessary to understand how the embeddedness of ICTs in traditional networks is 
reconfigurated according to local peculiarities and how this affects processes of 
democratisation.  
By bringing together research that is seldom in dialogue, this paper has challenged 
normative approaches to government communication, conflict and democratisation by 
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questioning a rigid formal/informal bifurcation of both governance and media and suggesting 
instead the need to take into account hybrid arrangements of governing structures, involving 
leaders with heterogeneous and, in some case, conflicting agendas. It has also underscored 
that government communication is a two-way process by pointing out that the key of good 
JRYHUQDQFHOLHVQRWRQO\LQDOHDGHU¶VDELOLW\WRHIIHFWLYHO\FRPPXQLFDWHZLWKKLVIROORZLQJE\
virtue of his charisma or his mastery of the political game, but also in his capacity to keep 
channels of communication open, including listening. ICTs have further expanded the 
possibility of timely interactions. The other side in young democracies, though, is that the 
interpersonal relations entertained by political leaders with their followers might be the 
ossified structure of neo-patrimonial networks cloaked in the comforting, and appealing to 
Western donors, language of democracy. As emerges from this literature review, despite 
conjuring notions of public sphere and open participation, the widespread adoption of digital 
media, and social media in particular, presents problematic aspects that might contribute to 
reproducing relations of subordination reverse democratic transitions. Further research is 
required, in the four MeCoDEM countries and beyond, to understand the factors shaping 
democratic trajectories at a local level and whether media, old and new, are a tool for 
countering authoritarian drifts, or merely a mirror of pre-existing inequalities and networks. 
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